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Yes We Should: Why the U.S. Should Change Its 
Policy Toward the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty 
Rachel Good* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Nineteen years ago, in October 1992, a group of six non-governmental 
organizations1 gathered in New York City’s Empire State Building to develop a strategy 
for achieving a worldwide ban on landmines.2  That meeting resulted in the launch of the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a coalition of NGOs dedicated to 
ending the humanitarian crisis caused by landmines.3  Four years later, the ICBL, along 
with a group of states,4 responded to a challenge from the Canadian Foreign Minister, 
Lord Axworthy, to begin negotiations on a treaty banning landmines.5  After only 
fourteen months of negotiations, the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (MBT),6 which banned the 
use, production, trade, and stockpile of anti-personnel landmines, was opened for 
signatures.7  On March 1, 1999, the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Ottawa 
Convention, entered into force.  As of February 21, 2011, there were 156 States Parties to 
the Mine Ban Treaty.8  The United States, however, remains outside of the Treaty despite 
initial support of its goal and continual humanitarian support for landmine survivors and 
landmine-affected countries.  The Obama administration should correct one of the lasting 
failures of the Clinton administration by joining the MBT.  
¶2 In the years since the Treaty entered into force, and as a direct result of the Treaty, 
the global landmines situation has changed dramatically.  In the mid-1990s, before the 
                                                 
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., International Studies, American University, 
2005. The author wishes to thank all those who have shown her that individuals, armed with passion and a 
plan, can change the world for the better. 
1 The organizations were Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines 
Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.   
2 Jody Williams & Stephen Goose, The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, in TO WALK WITHOUT 
FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN LANDMINES 22 (Maxwell A. Cameron et al. eds., 1998). 
3 STUART MASLEN, ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES UNDER HUMANITARIAN LAW: A VIEW FROM THE VANISHING 
POINT 16, 16-17 (2001). 
4 The so-called “core group” included Canada, Norway, Austria, and South Africa. Stephen D. Goose et al., 
Banning Landmines and Beyond, in BANNING LANDMINES: DISARMAMENT, CITIZEN DIPLOMACY, AND 
HUMAN SECURITY 3 (Jody Williams et al. eds., 2008). 
5 Id. at 1. 
6 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
Destruction, Dec. 3, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 [hereinafter Mine Ban Treaty].  
7 The complete history of the development of the Mine Ban Treaty along with the unique role of civil 
society, notably the ICBL, in its formation is well documented and outside the scope of this comment. See 
generally BANNING LANDMINES, supra note 4; LANDMINES AND HUMAN SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS AND WAR’S HIDDEN LEGACY (Richard A. Matthew et al. eds., 2004); Williams & Goose, supra 
note 2. 
8 INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, http:/www.icbl.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
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MBT, over 130 states stockpiled landmines9 and landmines killed or injured an estimated 
20,000 to 30,000 people every year.10 Only forty countries currently stockpile 
landmines,11 and there were an estimated 3,956 casualties in 2009.12  Although fifteen 
states used landmines in 1999, only Myanmar was believed to have used landmines in 
2010.13  With more than three-quarters of the world’s countries as States Parties to the 
MBT, landmines have become so stigmatized that even states not party to the Treaty 
behave consistently with its goal and provisions.  For example, the United States, which 
has refused to sign the Treaty, has adopted polices in-line with the spirit and goal of the 
MBT.14  The last time U.S. military forces used landmines was in the 1991 Gulf War,15 
and the U.S. enacted an export moratorium on landmines in 1992.16  Since 1993, the U.S. 
has provided more than $1.5 billion in humanitarian mine action, more than any other 
country, which includes funds used for demining resources and survivor services.17      
¶3 Although the Clinton administration adopted policies consistent with the spirit of 
the Treaty, the Bush administration announced a new landmine policy hostile to the 
Treaty in 2004.18  Under the Bush policy, the U.S. stopped using persistent landmines, 
but continues to use mines with self-destruct or deactivate mechanisms.  In explaining the 
new policy, the Bush administration stated, “[T]he U.S. did not and will not become a 
party to [the] Ottawa [Convention].”19  On November 24, 2009, the Obama 
administration announced that it would maintain the Bush administration’s landmine 
policy.20  The following day, the administration quickly backtracked stating that it was 
still conducting a review of the policy and had not decided whether to back the MBT.21  
There is no deadline for the completion of the Obama administration’s policy review.     
                                                 
9 LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2008, 8 (Mines Action Canada et al. eds., 2008). 
10 Alexander Kmentt, A Beacon of Light: The Mine Ban Treaty Since 1997, in BANNING LANDMINES, supra 
note 4, at 22; See also MASLEN, supra note 3, at 22-23.  
11 This figure includes States Parties to the Treaty whose stockpiles are marked for destruction: Belarus, 
Greece, Iraq, Turkey, and Ukraine. LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2010, 4, 15 (Mines Action Canada et al. 
eds., 2010).          
12 Id. at 1. 
13 There were serious allegations that the armed forces of Turkey, a state party, used anti-personnel mines 
in 2009. The allegations are under investigation. Id. at 3-4, 13. 
14 See Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm 
Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 561, 604 (2003) (explaining that after the U.S. refused to sign the Mine Ban Treaty, it still looked 
to the Treaty while developing alternatives). 
15 LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2008, supra note 9, at 1042. 
16 Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 
623, 656 (1998). 
17 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States is a World Leader in Humanitarian Mine Action 
(Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/132591.htm. 
18 Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Landmine Policy White Paper (Feb. 
27, 2004), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/30047.htm. 
19 Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Frequently Asked Questions on the 
New United States Landmine Policy (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/30050.htm. 
20 Press Release, Handicap International, Handicap International Denounces the Obama Administration’s 
Decision (Nov. 26, 2009), available at http://www.handicap-international.us/our-fight-against-landmines-
and-cluster-bombs/in-brief/?dechi_actus[id]=78&cHash=52704e79be. 
21 Desmond Butler, U.S. Corrects Statement on Land Mine Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 25, 2009, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-11-24-landmine-ban_N.htm. 
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¶4 Since the Treaty was signed, many states, including the U.S., have undergone a 
wide-scale shift in their policies and practices with regard to landmines.  While the MBT 
has yet to reach the level of customary international law22 there is significant indication 
“that an obligation to eliminate anti-personnel landmines is emerging.”23  Considering 
these developments in state behavior, the question becomes whether the U.S. should now 
join the MBT.  When the U.S. decided not to sign the Treaty in 1997, it cited the military 
utility of the weapon as the primary reason.24  This comment argues that the military 
utility argument was flawed in 1997 and has become even more so over the past 19 years 
due to the changing nature of warfare.  Also, since 1997, the U.S. has engaged in 
behavior, including launching two wars, which has isolated it from the larger 
international community and tarnished its reputation as a humanitarian nation.  Joining 
the MBT would provide the U.S. an ideal opportunity to re-engage with the international 
community and demonstrate its commitment to humanitarian action.   
¶5 Part II of this comment begins with a brief exploration of the history of landmine 
use.  Part III looks at the development of the Mine Ban Treaty, with a focus on U.S. 
policy and practice during the Treaty’s negotiation.  Part IV provides an overview of the 
Treaty’s provisions and of states’ compliance with and attitudes toward the Treaty.  Part 
V evaluates U.S. landmine policy since the development of the Treaty and proposes that 
the U.S.’s reasons for refusing to sign the Treaty are based on blind deference to the 
Pentagon rather than any legitimate military necessity.  The comment concludes with the 
recommendation that the Obama administration correct one of the lasting mistakes of the 
Clinton administration by ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty.  Joining the Treaty would also 
help engender international goodwill toward the U.S. after nearly a decade of strained 
relations.  
II. THE HISTORY OF LANDMINE USE AND THE ASSOCIATED HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS  
¶6 Anti-personnel landmines, or more simply landmines, are mines that are designed 
to explode and incapacitate, injure, or kill people when they make contact with it or come 
within its proximity.25  German forces in World War I developed the forerunner to the 
modern landmine when they blocked advancing French and British tank movement with 
buried artillery shells that had exposed fuses.26  The first modern landmines were actually 
anti-tank mines,27 or mines designed to detonate by the presence or contact of a vehicle as 
opposed to a person.28  Anti-tank mines were used by both the Allied and Axis powers 
                                                 
22 “[I]t cannot be said at this stage that the used of anti-personnel landmines is prohibited under customary 
international law.” JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: VOLUME 1, RULES 282 (2005). 
23 Id. at 283.  
24 See Jodi Preusser Mustoe, The 1997 Treaty to Ban the Use of Landmines: Was President Clinton’s 
Refusal to Become a Signatory Warranted?, 27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 555-56 (1999) (discussing the 
reasons behind the U.S. refusal to join the Mine Ban Treaty). 
25 Mine Ban Treaty, supra note 6, Art. 2.  
26 Alex Vines, The Crisis of Anti-Personnel Mines, in TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR, supra note 2, at 118; The 
Arms Project of Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, 
16 (1993). 
27 Andrew C.S. Efaw, The United States Refusal to Ban Landmines: The Intersection Between Tactics, 
Strategy, Policy, and International Law, 159 MIL. L. REV. 87, 89 (1999). 
28 Mine Ban Treaty, supra note 6, art. 2.  
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during World War II.29  However, anti-tank mines were easily removed and both sides 
developed smaller, anti-personnel mines to protect anti-tank minefields.30  Soon, anti-
personnel mines were used as stand alone weapons.31  For example, in Northern Africa, 
anti-personnel mines used by Italian and German forces stopped several Allied 
advances.32  After World War II, technological advances led to the development of new, 
modern landmines.33 
¶7 The U.S. engaged in the first truly modern use of landmines in Vietnam during the 
1960s.34  The U.S. used landmines throughout Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.35  In 
addition to the mines that the U.S. ground forces laid, the U.S. Air Force dropped mines 
from planes so often that pilots referred to them as “garbage.”36  The technological 
innovation of remote delivery increased the production and use of mines throughout the 
world.37  In Africa, 18 countries are mine-affected,38 and Angola, Somalia, Mozambique, 
Ethiopia, and Eritrea have the most serious mine contamination.39  In the Middle East, 
Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran have the most serious mine problems, although mines have also 
been used in Syria, Israel, and Lebanon.40  Mines have been used throughout Afghanistan 
and along the borders it shares with Pakistan, India, and China. Bosnia, Colombia, 
Croatia, El Salvador, Georgia, Nicaragua, Serbia, Tajikistan, and the former Yugoslavia 
have also been subject to large-scale landmine use.41  This is not an exclusive list of 
countries where landmines have been used, but it illustrates the extent to which mines 
were utilized throughout the twentieth century. 
¶8 The military utility of landmines was debated during negotiations of the 1997 Mine 
Ban Treaty.  While most of the world’s states concluded that the humanitarian problems 
associated with landmines outweighed their limited military utility, the U.S. continues to 
justify its refusal to sign the MBT based on the military utility argument.42  Proponents of 
landmines posit two main arguments for the weapon’s utility.  First, landmines are used 
to delay or deter an advancing enemy.43  Delaying an enemy force gives armies additional 
time for troop protection or movement to another location.44  Landmines can also be used 
                                                 
29 The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 26, at 16.  
30 Id. at 17. 
31 Id. 
32 Efaw, supra note 27, at 90; Vines, The Crisis of Anti-Personnel Mines, in TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR, 
supra note 26, at 119.  
33 Mustoe, supra note 24, at 542.  
34 The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 26, at 17.  
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 Don Hubert, THE LANDMINE BAN: A CASE STUDY IN HUMANITARIAN ADVOCACY 4 (Watson Institute for 
International Studies 2000), http://www.geneva-forum.org/Reports/20010202.pdf (last visited April 19, 
2011). 
38 A mine-affected country is simply a country with mine contamination, that is, either marked or 
unmarked mined portions of land. 
39 See The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 26, at 143. 
40 Id. at 143-44. 
41 Id. at 144. 
42 Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 18.  
43 See The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 26, at 21. ; 
Robert G. Gard, Jr., The Military Utility of Anti-Personnel Mines, in TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR, supra note 
2, at 144.  
44 Gard, supra note 43, at 144. 
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along borders to deter and protect against enemy invasions.45 Second, armies use 
landmines to shape the battlefield by forcing enemy troops into vulnerable positions.46  
Once enemy forces are channeled into vulnerable areas, they are more susceptible to 
attacks by other weapons systems such as artillery or rockets.47  In practice, however, the 
military utility of landmines is limited. 
¶9 A study issued by the International Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC) and 
conducted by a group of active and retired military leaders from nineteen countries found 
that landmines have “little to no effect on the outcome of hostilities” and only “marginal 
tactical advantage” in certain specific circumstances.48  The group of military experts 
gathered by the ICRC asked the simple question of whether there was empirical data to 
demonstrate the high military utility of landmines.49  Of twenty-six major conflicts the 
experts studied, they failed to find a single case “in which the use of anti-personnel mines 
played a major role in determining the outcome of a conflict.”50  Although landmines do 
have utility in some circumstances,51 they are never outcome-determinative. 
¶10 In the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi forces laid 9 million mines to delay coalition forces.  
Using large-scale mine plows, coalition forces cleared the minefield in only two hours.52  
The increased use of armored tanks, coupled with specialized plows and rollers to clear 
minefields has decreased the effectiveness of landmines as a delay tactic.53  Also, 
minefields constructed to delay or deter enemies pose a risk to friendly forces.  Between 
1961 and 1990, twenty-three people, including seventeen U.S. service personnel, were 
killed in minefields laid by U.S. forces around Guantanamo Bay.54  After evaluating the 
delay capacity of landmines, ICRC’s military experts determined that landmines do slow 
battles, but battles are won or lost based on leadership and other materials.55  As for their 
deterrent capacity, the experts concluded that landmines “have never yet stopped a 
determined advancing enemy.”56 
¶11 The same critique about the effectiveness of landmines as a delay tactic applies to 
their effectiveness as a channeling tool.  In both cases plows and rollers, as well as better 
automatic weapons and protected vehicles, render landmines “redundant.”57  Also, the 
arguments in support of landmine use assume that enemy forces are unwilling to accept 
high numbers of casualties.58  Gen. Alfred Gray, a retired commander of the U.S. Marine 
Corps argued against the utility of landmines when he said, “I know of no situation... 
where our use of mine warfare truly channelized the enemy and brought him into a 
                                                 
45 Id.  
46 The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 26, at 21; Gard, 
supra note 43, at 141.  
47 Int’l Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC), Anti-Personnel Landmines-Friend or Foe? 14-15 (1997) 
[hereinafter ICRC]. 
48 Id. at 8, 80. 
49 Id. at 5. 
50 Id. at 7. 
51 Gard, supra note 43, at 137. 
52 ICRC, supra note 47, at 40.  
53 Id. at 42; Gard, supra note 43, at 141. 
54 LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 1999, 318 (Human Rights Watch et al. eds., 1999). 
55 ICRC, supra note 47, at 40. 
56 Id. at 15. 
57 ICRC, Report on observations and conclusions from a review of the ICRC study “Anti-personnel 
landmines, Friend or Foe?,” 2 (2004). 
58 ICRC, supra note 47, at 43. 
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destructive power.  I’m not aware of any operational advantage from broad deployment 
of mines.”59  
¶12 A majority of states have determined that the limited military utility of landmines 
cannot justify their use when weighed against humanitarian costs.  Long after their 
military use is finished in a given region, landmines remain in the ground to kill and 
injure civilians.  Unlike a bullet, which cannot injure except at the time it is fired, a 
landmine remains lethal until it is safely removed from the ground.  Not only do 
landmines that remain in the ground have a costly physical impact, they also a have a 
psychological and economic impact on affected individuals and communities.60  It is 
estimated that there are over 300,000 landmine survivors throughout the world.61  Many 
of these survivors live in countries that struggle to meet the basic needs of their 
population, making it especially difficult to provide extra services for mine survivors 
such as medical care or job training.62   
¶13 In communities where people struggle to sustain themselves, landmine survivors 
are often seen as a drain on resources because they are limited in their ability to work and 
provide for themselves.63  Because landmine survivors are predominately located in poor 
areas, they are often stigmatized in their communities for their disabilities.64  This 
stigmatization, and the resulting sense of helplessness, leads many landmine survivors to 
feel depressed and angry.65  At the community level, landmines can also have a 
devastating economic impact by making swaths of land unusable for transportation and 
trade, farming, herding, or animal grazing.  The civilian impact of landmines goes 
beyond the immediate physical injury to the individual.   
¶14 Humanitarian problems such as those described above result from every instance of 
landmine use, because by their nature landmines are weapons of indiscriminate effect.66  
Once a landmine is placed in the ground, there is no way to prevent a civilian from 
triggering its detonation.  Furthermore, landmines are inexpensive weapons to use but 
costly to remove.  As a result, countless landmines remain in communities after the 
cessation of hostilities.  This makes them appealing weapons for guerrilla forces because 
they are easy to acquire and can be used to depopulate or terrorize poor communities 
even after the fighting is stopped.67  Because landmines are inherently indiscriminate, 
there is no ‘technological fix’ to the humanitarian problems they cause. This 
determination, coupled with the weapon’s limited military utility, led 156 states to 
develop the Mine Ban Treaty banning the use, transfer, and stockpiling of landmines.  In 
an attempt to comprehensively deal with the humanitarian crisis caused by landmines, the 
Treaty also created an obligation for parties to clear mined land and provide assistance to 
survivors of landmines.  
                                                 
59 Id. at 44-45; Gard, supra note 43, at 141. 
60 See generally LANDMINES AND HUMAN SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND WAR’S HIDDEN 
LEGACY (Richard A. Matthew et al. eds., 2004).    
61 Raquel Willerman, Victim Assistance: Landmine Survivors’ Perspectives, in LANDMINES AND HUMAN 
SECURITY, supra note 60, at 103. 
62 Sheree Bailey & Tun Channareth, Beyond the Rhetoric: The Mine Ban Treaty and Victim Assistance, in 
BANNING LANDMINES, supra note 4, at 145. 
63 Id. at 145-46. 
64 Id. at 145. 
65 Willerman, Victim Assistance, in LANDMINES AND HUMAN SECURITY, supra note 61, at 109. 
66 ICRC, supra note 47, at 9. 
67 Id. at 21. 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINE BAN TREATY AND THE U.S. ROLE  
¶15 In many ways, the Mine Ban Treaty was the result of U.S. efforts to call attention 
to and address the global landmine crisis.  However, the scope of the eventual agreement 
was unimaginable to the U.S. or any other country in 1992.  That year, the process was 
ignited by two key events.  First, the International Campaign to Bank Landmines (ICBL) 
was formally established and launched a call for a global ban on landmines.68  Second, 
U.S. President Bill Clinton issued a one-year moratorium on the export of landmines.69  
The U.S. decision to halt the export of landmines, a revolutionary act at the time, gave the 
movement to ban landmines much needed political capital.70   
¶16 After the initial call for an export moratorium, President Clinton continued to lead 
the international community on the need for action on the landmine crisis.  In an address 
before the UN General Assembly on September 26, 1994, President Clinton called upon 
other states to join the U.S. in “ridding the world of those often hidden weapons.”71  In an 
accompanying policy sheet, the U.S. proposed “the negotiation of a multinational 
landmine control regime” with the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of anti-
personnel landmines.72  President Clinton’s statement before the UN General Assembly, 
along with the policy announcement, was seen as a signal of U.S. support for a global ban 
on landmines.  As the world took up the call and began to work toward such a ban, it 
quickly became evident that the U.S. was unwilling to turn rhetoric into action. 
¶17 The U.S. call for more action on the problem of landmines prompted states to 
discuss a solution within the UN framework.73  States first sought to amend the UN 
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which is a leading treaty banning or 
restricting specific types of weapons that cause unnecessary or unjustified suffering, such 
as incendiary weapons or blinding laser weapons.74  The original CCW contained a 
protocol pertaining in part to landmines,75 but by the mid-1990s it was deemed 
inadequate to deal with the landmine problem.76  In 1996, States Parties to the CCW77 
passed Amended Protocol II (APII), also referred to as the Landmine Protocol.78  APII 
was an attempt by major powers like the U.S. to address the humanitarian problems 
associated with landmines.  However, it only advocated for the end of “indiscriminate 
                                                 
68 Williams & Goose, supra note 2, at 20. 
69 Efaw, supra note 27, at 99. 
70 Id. 
71 UN GAOR, 49th Sess., 4th plen. mtg, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/49/PV.4 (Sept. 26, 1994). 
72 Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, U.S. Policy on a Landmine Control Regime 
(Sept. 26, 1994). 
73 Mary Wareham, Rhetoric and Policy Realities in the US, in TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR, supra note 2, at 
226-28 (tracking the U.S.’s “two-track” approach to the landmine problem). 
74 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 
199 I.L.M. 1524 [hereinafter CCW]. 
75 CCW Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
(Protocol II), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, 19 I.L.M. 1529 [hereinafter CCW Protocol II]. 
76 Bryan McDonald, The Global Landmine Crisis in the 1990s, in LANDMINES AND HUMAN SECURITY, 
supra note 60, at 24. 
77 At that time there were only forty-one States Parties to the CCW. Wexler, supra note 14, at 582. 
78 CCW Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as 
Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention as amended on 3 May 1996), 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609, 19 I.L.M. 1206 [hereinafter CCW Amended Protocol II]. 
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use” of landmines and not an end to all landmine use.79  APII urged states to take 
precautions in using landmines, but it lacked any enforcement mechanism and did not 
call for an all-out prohibition on use.80  While it was a good first step, APII fell far short 
of the total ban on landmines hoped for by anti-mine advocates. 81  At the same time 
states worked to pass APII, the ICBL worked to garner support from states for a separate, 
more comprehensive ban in the spirit of the U.S. call to action at the September 1994 UN 
General Assembly meeting.82  Since the ICBL advocated an immediate and total ban on 
landmines, the ban community regarded APII as irrelevant when it was passed.83 
¶18 In October 1996, months after APII was negotiated, Canada hosted a conference in 
Ottawa to discuss alternative forums outside of the UN for developing a more progressive 
solution to the landmine crisis.84  Participant states were required to pledge support for a 
total ban on landmines, but states not ready to make this pledge were invited to attend as 
observers.85  The U.S. attended as a full participant, having signed the pledge.86  At the 
end of the conference, Canadian Foreign Minister Lord Axworthy challenged states to 
negotiate a treaty banning landmines by December 1997 and invited states to return to 
Ottawa at that time to sign the treaty.87  Civil society groups embraced Axworthy’s 
challenge, but some states were skeptical of the announcement.88  After the conference, 
U.S. officials privately rebuked the Canadian government for Lord Axworthy’s 
statement.89  However, a core group of states decided to work with the ICBL to meet 
Axworthy’s challenge, launching the “Ottawa Process” that resulted in the 1997 Mine 
Ban Treaty. 
¶19 Working outside of the normal diplomatic channels of the UN, states met in cities 
around the world for preparatory conferences in advance of a formal treaty negotiation 
session.90  The goal of those meetings was to reach consensus on the aim and scope of the 
Treaty.91  The U.S. declined to formally participate in any of the preparatory 
conferences.92  Instead, the U.S. opted to work on the issue within the Conference on 
Disarmament,93 a permanent UN-based forum for disarmament negotiations.  However, 
by this time most states had determined that the Ottawa Process was the only route to a 
global ban94 since the Conference on Disarmament is a consensus-based forum, meaning 
                                                 
79 Wexler, supra note 14, at 582.  
80 Id. at 583.   
81 Williams & Goose, supra note 2, at 26.  See also Wexler, supra note 14, at 582; Christian M. Capece, 
The Ottawa Treaty and Its Impact on U.S. Military Policy and Planning, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 183, 188 
(1999); McDonald, supra note 76, at 29.  
82 Williams & Goose, supra note 2, at 26; McDonald, supra note 76, at 29. 
83 Koh, supra note 16, at 659; Wexler, supra note 14, at 583. 
84 Koh, supra note 16, at 659-60; Williams & Goose, supra note 2, at 34. 
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that all states must agree on all aspects of a proposed treaty.95  As a result, states can 
drag-out issues for years or force other states to settle for the weakest possible 
agreement.96  Given that, states serious about a ban moved forward with the Ottawa 
Process and the 1997 Oslo Conference, where ninety-seven states met for formal 
negotiations to create what was to become the Mine Ban Treaty.  
¶20 The singular goal of the Oslo Conference was to negotiate a “comprehensive ban 
on the use, production, stockpiling, trade and transfer of anti-personnel mines.”97  
Realizing that the Oslo Conference was likely to lead to a treaty banning landmines,98 the 
U.S. attended in an attempt to shape the outcome and participate in the development of 
the new norm.  Canadian officials believed that if the U.S. did not participate in the 
Conference it would likely never sign the Treaty.99  However, other participants, 
especially civil society groups such as the ICBL, did not welcome the U.S. delegation 
because they knew the U.S. was entering the process late and with concrete demands that 
would weaken the Treaty.100 
¶21 The U.S. came to Oslo with confidence that other states would want it as a 
signatory so much that they would agree to its non-negotiable demands.101  The U.S. 
sought an explicit exception in the Treaty that would allow for the continual 
emplacement of mines along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South 
Korea.102  The U.S. wanted a definition of “anti-personnel landmines103” that would allow 
it to use anti-personnel mines in conjunction with anti-tank mines.104  Finally, the U.S. 
wanted a delayed entry-into-force so that it could continue to deploy mines until 
alternative technology was developed and a “supreme national interest” provision 
allowing withdrawal from the Treaty when it was in a nation’s national interest to do 
so.105  Civil society participants reacted negatively and vocally to U.S. demands by 
arguing that the U.S. was trying to create exceptions so that the Treaty would not apply to 
its use and stockpiles of mines.106  A rallying call of “no exceptions, no delays, no 
loopholes” was taken up by civil society groups.107  Other states agreed with the civil 
society groups and believed that the U.S. demands would unacceptably weaken the 
Treaty.  As a result, they refused to accept or allow any of the reservations the U.S. 
demanded.108   
¶22 On September 17, 1997, after being granted a twenty-four hour delay in the 
negotiations, the U.S. returned to the conference and withdrew its demands and support 
for the Treaty negotiations.109  The negotiations moved forward without the U.S., and on 
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September 18, 1997, and the participants of the Oslo Conference adopted the text of the 
Treaty.110  In October 1997, the Nobel Committee announced that the ICBL and its 
coordinator Jody Williams were the winners of the 1997 Nobel Prize for Peace for their 
work in developing the Treaty.111  Spurred by the momentum from the Peace Prize, the 
Treaty received 122 signatures the day it opened for signature and entered into force 
more rapidly than any other treaty of its kind.112   
IV. THE MINE BAN TREATY PROVISIONS AND COMPLIANCE 
¶23 The MBT provides a complete prohibition on the use, stockpiling, trade, and 
production of anti-personnel landmines.  A landmine as defined by the Treaty is any mine 
that is designed to explode “by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that 
will incapacitate, injury, or kill one or more persons.”113  Under this definition, munitions 
that are altered to function like landmines are prohibited, as are booby-traps.114  Excluded 
from the definition, however, are mines that can function through both command 
detonation, which is remote detonation through electric means, and victim-activation, 
which means detonation by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person.115  The ICBL 
and numerous States Parties urge states to disable the victim-activated component of 
those mines that can function through command detonation or victim-activation.116  States 
Parties to the Treaty disagree as to whether anti-vehicle mines are prohibited by the 
Treaty.117  An explicit ban on anti-vehicle mines was removed from the text during 
negotiations,118 however, twenty-four of the twenty-eight states that have commented on 
the issue interpret the Treaty to ban anti-vehicle mines, since a person can unintentionally 
cause detonation.119  Even though these two interpretation issues exist, the MBT is a 
comprehensive ban on all mines that indiscriminately kill and injure people by design.   
¶24 Article 1 outlines the Treaty’s general obligations for States Parties not to use, 
develop, produce, or stockpile anti-personnel mines.120  States cannot “assist, encourage, 
or induce” other states, including states not party to the Treaty, in activities prohibited 
under the Treaty.121  Finally, States Parties must destroy all stockpiles of anti-personnel 
mines.122   
¶25 Article 1 raises two important unresolved issues.  The first issue is that it is unclear 
what acts of assistance fall within the Treaty’s prohibition.123  This question pertains to 
                                                 
110 Lawson et al., supra note 88, at 180.  
111 Koh, supra note 16, at 661-62. 
112 Goose et al., supra note 4, at 3-4. 
113 Mine Ban Treaty, supra note 6, art. 2(1). 
114 Thomas Hajnoczi et al., The Ban Treaty, in TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR, supra note 2, at 298. 
115 Fact Sheet, Landmine Monitor, Claymore-Type and OZM-72 Command-Detonated Mines (May 2006), 
available at http://www.lm.icbl.org/index.php/content/view/full/19772. 
116 Id. 
117 Fact Sheet, Landmine Monitor, Mines with Sensitive Fuzes and Sensitive Antihandling Devices (Article 
2) (May 2006), available at http://www.lm.icbl.org/index.php/content/view/full/19770. 
118 Hajnoczi et al., supra note 114, at 297.  
119 Fact Sheet, Landmine Monitor, supra note 117.  
120 Mine Ban Treaty, supra note 6, art. 1(1). 
121 Id. art. 1(1)(c). 
122 Id. art. 1(2). 
123 LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2010, supra note 11, at 10. 
Vol. 9:2] RACHEL GOOD 219 
 
joint military operations between States Parties and non-parties and whether and to what 
degree States Parties can engage in combat activities with states that use mines.  The 
second issue concerns the foreign stockpiling and transit of mines on and through the 
territory of States Parties.124  The key issues are whether states that are not party must 
remove stockpiled mines from States Parties’ territory and whether they may transport 
mines through States Parties’ territory.  These are on-going issues of interpretation that 
States Parties discuss at annual meetings in an attempt to reach a consensus. 
¶26 States Parties are required under Article 4 to destroy their stockpile of anti-
personnel mines within four years of joining the Treaty.125  However, Article 3 provides 
an exception, allowing a limited number of mines to be retained for training and 
development purposes.126  The exact number of mines allowed for retention is a contested 
issue.  Most States Parties propose that the number should be in the hundreds, and that 
retained mines should be actively used and destroyed through training programs.127  This 
is another on-going issue of contention for States Parties to the Treaty. 
¶27 Article 5 requires States Parties to destroy all anti-personnel mines in affected areas 
within ten years of joining the Treaty.128  Included in this article is the requirement that 
States Parties identify mined areas in their jurisdiction, mark them, and protect civilians 
from entering through fences and other security measures.129  Given the large number of 
mined areas in some States Parties’ territories and the time it may take some States 
Parties to generate resources, Article 5 allows States Parties to apply for an extension to 
their demining deadlines.130  In 2010, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania applied 
for extensions for the first time, and Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe applied for 
extensions for the second time.131  During the 2009 Second Review Conference of States 
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, four states—Argentina, Cambodia, Tajikistan, and 
Uganda—requested and were granted extensions for clearing mined areas.132  At the 2009 
Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, fifteen states requested extensions.133  
However, as more states approach their clearance deadlines, more requests for extensions 
are expected.   
¶28 The Mine Ban Treaty articles on use, production, demining, transfer, and stockpile 
destruction are considered general core obligations that States Parties must comply with 
to avoid violating the Treaty.134  Article 1 mandates that States Parties may not use, 
develop or produce, or stockpile anti-personnel mines “under any circumstances.”  
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Likewise, Articles 4 and 5 require states to comply with their specific provisions.  On the 
other hand, the Treaty’s international cooperation and victim assistance provisions are 
soft requirements for which it would be difficult to hold any state party in violation.  For 
example, Article 6 on international cooperation and assistance is a soft obligation that 
encourages states to support other parties in complying with their general obligations to 
the Treaty.135  Under Article 6 States Parties “in a position to do so” should provide 
assistance and care for mine victims and mine awareness, or education programs.136  
Those States Parties “in a position to do so” should also provide assistance for mine 
clearance.137  The goal of these provisions is not only for States Parties to provide these 
services domestically, but also for wealthier States Parties to assist those with fewer 
resources in providing services to their populations.  The soft provisions of the Treaty, 
however, are nevertheless a focus for States Parties and are routinely advanced through 
the Treaty standing committee on victim assistance.138  
¶29 State compliance with the MBT is tracked in three ways.  First, States Parties must 
submit annual transparency reports under Article 7 of the Treaty.  Second, States Parties 
must hold annual meetings.  Finally, the ICBL produces an annual Landmine Monitor 
Report.  The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs also hosts an Implementation and 
Support Unit for the Mine Ban Treaty, which advises states on the implementation of the 
Treaty’s provisions.  Among these tracking instruments, the Landmine Monitor Report is 
widely regarded at the authoritative source for information on state compliance with the 
Treaty.139   
¶30 An evaluation of state compliance with the MBT illustrates how the Treaty has 
contributed to the significant decrease in the use of landmines and their destructive 
impact.  Only two states—Russia and Myanmar—have used landmines since 2007, 
which is a decrease from the nineteen states reported to have used landmines in 1999.140  
Also, there has been no confirmed use of landmines by States Parties.141  In addition to 
the widespread adoption of the MBT by states, fifty-nine non-state armed groups have 
pledged to stop using landmines.142  Since 1999, eighty-six States Parties have destroyed 
their stockpiles of landmines and 45 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed.143  Of 
the fifty-one states known to have produced landmines, thirty-nine have stopped 
production, including five states that are not party to the Treaty.144 Twelve states not 
party reserve the right to produce landmines, but only three are believed to actually 
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produce mines.145  China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, 
South Korea, and the U.S. have enacted formal moratoria on the export of landmines.146  
More than 2.2 million landmines have been demined since 1999 and over 3,200 square 
kilometers of land has been cleared.147  This simple numerical overview demonstrates the 
overwhelming compliance by both States Parties and states not party to the Treaty. 
¶31 In addition to acting in accordance with the MBT, states not party have made 
explicit statements in support of the Treaty.  Every year the UN General Assembly 
sponsors a resolution calling for the universalization of the MBT, and nineteen states not 
party to the Treaty voted in favor of the 2010 resolution.148  In explaining its 2009 vote in 
favor of the of the First Committee version of the annual General Assembly Resolution, 
Singapore, a non-party, explained that it “supports and will continue to support all 
initiatives” and that since 1998 it has had an export moratorium in place for all anti-
personnel landmines.149  States have declared their support and interest in the MBT 
outside of the UN.  For example, the Foreign Minister of Bahrain stated, “Bahrain 
endorses the treaty’s aims and principles and continues to study closely the possibility of 
accession.”150  Even China has expressed an “ultimate goal of a total ban” on 
landmines.151  It has also submitted yearly MBT transparency reports, which track state 
compliance with the Treaty’s provisions.152  States not party have also shown support for 
the MBT by attending meetings of States Parties to the Treaty as observers.  Nineteen 
states not party, including China, Egypt, India, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, attended the 
2009 Second Review Conference to the Mine Ban Treaty.153  Since the MBT entered into 
forces, states not party have not only expressed support for the Treaty, they have acted in 
conformity with a number of its provisions, demonstrating near universal regard for the 
Treaty.   
V. EVALUATING U.S. LANDMINE POLICY SINCE 1997  
¶32 As discussed in Part III, the U.S. landmine policy under President Clinton was one 
of the most progressive in the world until the development of the MBT.  Over the course 
of his administration, Clinton toed the line between calling for international action 
against landmines and supporting policies protecting the United State’s right to use what 
it deemed “safe” landmines.  The outcome of this approach was a policy that was 
extremely deferential to the military and focused on humanitarian programs and funding.  
While the U.S. did not sign the MBT under Clinton, it committed to join in the near 
future.154  However, under President George W. Bush, the U.S. foreswore the Treaty as a 
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solution to the landmine problem and chose to focus on humanitarian programs.155  An 
evaluation of U.S. landmine policy since the mid-1990s illustrates a lack of political 
leadership and extreme deference to the military.  Despite the humanitarian costs 
associated with landmines and their limited military utility, neither Presidents Clinton nor 
Bush chose or desired to break from military leaders on this issue.  There is no clear 
indication of the direction President Obama will take on the MBT, meaning that now is 
the time to reevaluate U.S. arguments against signing. 
¶33 When President Clinton took office, Congress had already flagged landmines as an 
important issue for the U.S. to address.  In October 1992, President George H. W. Bush 
signed the Leahy-Evans landmine export moratorium.156  Legislation extending the 
moratorium for another three years passed the following year under Clinton.157  Building 
off of Congress’s efforts, Clinton led the call for an international agreement regulating 
landmines.  However, the U.S.’s reluctance to work outside of the UN meant that it 
joined the Ottawa Process negotiations too late to influence the content of the MBT.158   
¶34 The day the U.S. withdrew from the Treaty negotiations, Clinton held a press 
conference to detail a new landmine policy and discuss why the U.S. would not join the 
Treaty.  During the press conference, Clinton gave two main reasons why he would not 
support the Treaty.  First, it would in effect ban U.S. anti-tank mines.159  Anti-personnel 
mines are placed near U.S. anti-tank mines to protect the anti-tank mine from being lifted 
or removed by enemy forces.160  The U.S. defines the mines laid near the anti-tank mines 
as anti-handling devices, not mines, and defines the entire system as a “mixed 
munition.”161  The MBT defines anti-handing devices as devices “intended to protect a 
mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to, or placed under the mine and which 
activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the 
mine.”162  Since the mines associated with U.S. anti-tank mines are not “part of, linked to, 
attached to, or placed under” the anti-tank mine, they qualify as banned anti-personnel 
mines under the MBT.  As such, the U.S. determined it would not sign the Treaty since it 
did not obtain an exemption for its anti-tank mine system. 
¶35 Clinton’s second reason for not signing the Treaty was the lack of a timetable to 
phase out mines.163  Until the U.S. developed alternative technologies, landmines were 
considered an essential part of the U.S. arsenal.  To highlight this point, Clinton stated 
that landmines are necessary along the DMZ.  He further explained that “[i]n the event of 
an attack...[o]ur antipersonnel mines are a key part of our defense line in Korea.”164  
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Clinton also sought to justify his decision as essential to protecting “the safety and 
security of our men and women in uniform.”165  Although these were Clinton’s publicly 
stated reasons for not signing the Treaty, behind the scenes politics also played a key role 
in Clinton’s decision. 
¶36 Unlike other countries were the landmine ban was dealt with primarily as a 
humanitarian issue, in the United States it remained squarely a military issue.166  The U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff was resistant to removing landmines from its arsenal.167  The 
Pentagon actively lobbied Clinton not to sign the Treaty, even though military officials 
did not necessarily have plans to use landmines.168  In their view, landmines might save 
soldiers’ lives in some circumstances, and the U.S. should not ban the weapons without 
replacement technologies.169  On the other hand, Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
supported U.S. participation in the Treaty.170  The State Department, however, failed to 
launch a campaign in support of the Treaty to adequately rival that of the Pentagon, 
because it was uncertain of Clinton’s political commitment to the issue.171   
¶37 Clinton’s deference to the Joint Chiefs may have had to do with his fear of straining 
his relationship with the military.  Not having served in Vietnam, the military treated 
Clinton as an outsider.172  Clinton acknowledged that the landmine issue in particular 
strained his relationship with the Joint Chiefs to the point where he concluded that could 
not “risk a breach” with them over the issue.173  When Clinton publicly denounced the 
MBT he did so in the language of the Pentagon, labeling landmines as a military 
necessity essential to protecting soldiers.174  This language, far different than that he used 
at the U.N. a few years earlier when he called for a global ban on landmines, was an 
indication that Clinton bowed to the pressure of the Joint Chiefs and adopted their 
position on the MBT.175 
¶38 Clinton’s priorities in Congress were another factor in the U.S.’s failure to sign the 
MBT.  At the time, Jesse Helms, a pro-military senator who was hostile toward treaties in 
general, headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.176  Clinton’s top priority was 
obtaining Senate approval for the expansion of NATO and he did not want to risk 
spending political capital by pushing the MBT.177 Clinton expected to face criticism for 
his decision both domestically and internationally, so to mitigate the outcry, he launched 
a series of policies limiting the use of certain landmines and committed the U.S. to sign 
the MBT in the future. 
¶39 Both before and after the MBT negotiations Clinton implemented many policies 
regarding landmines.  In 1996, Clinton simultaneously called for a global ban on 
landmines, banned the use of all non-self-destructing landmines, and ordered the 
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demilitarization of all such weapons by the end of 1999.178  In this same announcement, 
however, Clinton put the international community on notice that the U.S. would not sign 
an international ban that does not “protect our right to use APL [in Korea] until 
alternatives become available or the risk of aggression has been removed.”179  The 
following year, prior to joining the Ottawa Process, the U.S. announced “a permanent ban 
on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines” and a cap on the current landmine 
stockpile.180   
¶40 In 1998, after choosing not to join the Treaty, President Clinton signed Presidential 
Decision Directive 64.  Under this directive, the Department of Defense was to stop using 
anti-personnel landmines, save for mixed munitions,181 outside of Korea by 2003.182  The 
Directive also ordered the Department of Defense to find alternatives to all anti-personnel 
landmines by 2006 so that the U.S. could stop using mines worldwide and join the 
Treaty.183  Additionally, Clinton launched “Demining 2010,” a presidential initiative 
dedicated to accelerating international demining efforts.184  Through the initiative, the 
U.S. committed to doubling the annual budget for the Department of State’s 
Humanitarian Demining Program from $40 million to $80 million.185  Taken together, 
these polices were stepping-stones toward the U.S. joining the Mine Ban Treaty.  In light 
of Clinton’s refusal to sign the Treaty in 1997, these were the only real options the U.S. 
had to maintain its image as a country serious about landmines.  
¶41 Three years into the Bush administration, the U.S. turned its back on ever joining 
the MBT.  In 2004, after conducting a landmine policy review, the Bush administration 
announced that the U.S. would no longer seek to join the MBT.186  Under the new policy, 
the U.S. would cease using all landmines, except those with self-destructing or 
deactivating capabilities.187  The U.S. would continue to reserve the right to use 
landmines without self-destructing or deactivating devices in Korea through the end of 
2010.188  However, the U.S. transferred the landmines along the DMZ to South Korea and 
they are no longer classified as U.S. mines.189  Finally, under the new landmine policy, 
Bush sought $70 million in humanitarian mine action funding—a fifty percent increase 
from 2003 funding level.190  While this policy looks progressive, the MBT prohibits self-
destructing or deactivating landmines.  As long as the Bush administration policy is in 
effect, the U.S. cannot join the Treaty.   
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¶42 Bush officials outlined two goals for the new policy.  First, it would ensure that the 
U.S. “military [had] the defensive capabilities it needs to protect [its] own and friendly 
forces.”191  Second, it would seek “to end the humanitarian risks posed by landmines.”192  
As for the military capabilities, the administration stated that landmines “have a valid and 
essential role” because they can aid in shaping the battlefield, delay the enemy, increase 
the effectiveness of other weapons, and save troops’ lives.193  The fact that the policy 
allowed for extended use of persistent mines in Korea, illustrates that the U.S. viewed 
landmines as necessary to the Korean defensive strategy.  The administration believed 
increased humanitarian funding was “in the best interest of the United States” because it 
“enhances [the United States’] reputation.”194  Despite the increased humanitarian aid, the 
Bush policy is extremely pro-military in its defense of the military utility of landmines.  
¶43 Unlike the Clinton administration, which did not explicitly defer to the military, the 
Bush administration stated that its policy was based on the military’s judgment.  At a 
February 2004 press conference on the new policy, Dr. Joseph Collins, a deputy assistant 
secretary to defense, stated, “It is the considered judgment of our senior military 
commanders that they need the defensive capabilities that landmines can provide.”195  
Like Clinton, Bush was a civilian president who military leaders saw as having avoided 
service in Vietnam, and this might have led Bush to be more deferential to the military.196  
Bush was also overseeing two wars as Commander-in-Chief.  Even if Bush personally 
supported the MBT, pushing the military on the issue could have seriously affected the 
war effort and his relationship with the military. 
¶44 President Barack Obama entered office with the goal of quickly overturning many 
Bush administration policies.197  It does not appear, however, that the Bush landmine 
policy was one that the Obama administration seriously evaluated.  In November 2009, 
the Obama administration announced that it would send an observer delegation of State 
Department and Department of Defense officials to the Second Review Conference of the 
Mine Ban Treaty.198  At the same time, it was revealed that the administration had already 
undertaken and finished a review of U.S. landmine policy.199  The conclusion of the 
review was that the Obama administration would not join the MBT because the U.S. 
“would not be able to meet [its] national defense needs, nor [its] national … security 
commitment to [its] friends and allies” if it joined.200  This statement was largely a 
reiteration of the Bush administration’s reasons for refusing to join the Treaty.   
¶45 The Obama administration was immediately criticized for adopting the Bush 
administration’s policy and began to backtrack.  Senator Patrick Leahy, the leading 
Congressional advocate of the MBT, labeled the administration’s review and policy 
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“cursory and half-hearted”201 and “deeply disappointing to those...who expected a 
serious, thorough reexamination of this issue.”202  Human Rights Watch criticized the 
decision as “a reprehensible rejection of the most successful disarmament and 
humanitarian treaty of the past decade” saying that it “lacks vision, compassion, and 
basic common sense.”203  In light of the strong negative reaction, the Obama 
administration reversed course one day after reaffirming the Bush policy, claiming that it 
had only conducted a “partial review” and that the policy was still under consideration.204 
¶46 Obama’s decision to send representatives to a meeting of the Mine Ban Treaty for 
the first time was welcomed by Human Rights Watch and the ICBL.205  At the same time, 
the U.S. statement at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty showed 
continued deference to the military by pointing out that U.S. landmine policy must take 
into consideration national defense, security commitments to allies, and the protection of 
U.S. troops.206  The statement seemed to reference a need to reserve the right to use 
landmines in Afghanistan and Iraq.207  Instead of simply deferring to the military, the 
Obama administration should take into account the many counter-perspectives when 
evaluating the weapon’s military utility and their role in Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan.   
¶47 The military utility of landmines as a justification for their continued use was 
discussed in Part II of this comment.  The conclusion of that discussion, that landmines 
have a limited military utility that does not outweigh their humanitarian harm, applies to 
the U.S. contention that landmines are a necessary part of the U.S. arsenal.  While the 
U.S. military has sustained a prolonged campaign against the MBT, there is no consensus 
within the military on the utility of the weapon.  In a New York Times advertisement 
placed during the Clinton administration, a group of sixteen four-star generals denied the 
military utility of the weapon and called on the president to sign the MBT.208  Even 
before then, the Department of Defense contracted with the Institute for Defense Analysis 
(IDA) to review the military utility of landmines.209  The IDA determined that landmines 
have a “quite modest” utility and a decision not to join ban negotiations based on the 
weapon’s utility would require “an especially demanding set of assumptions about the 
nature of future warfare” that may not be valid.210  A second study issued by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and conducted by the Dupuy Institute looked at the consequences to the 
military if there was a total ban on landmines.211  The Dupuy Institute concluded that “a 
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total ban...if eventually adhered to by most nations, will only benefit US ground forces in 
the long run” and resulted in a recommendation “that the United States support a total 
ban on anti-personnel mines.”212  However, the U.S. continued to refuse to join the MBT 
pointing to the need to protect anti-tank mines and honor U.S. military commitments 
abroad. 
¶48 U.S. anti-tank mines are banned under the MBT because they are surrounded by 
anti-personnel mines; the U.S. classifies these anti-tank mines as anti-handling devices.  
The U.S. system is not the only possible anti-tank mine system.  Other systems, like those 
employed by many European powers, are allowed under the MBT.  Instead of utilizing 
landmines as anti-handling devices, European anti-tank mines include anti-handling 
devices that are attached on top or below the anti-tank mines,213 the use of which is 
permissible under the MBT.  This alternative system, which has been used by other 
countries for years, negates the need for landmines as a component of the U.S. anti-tank 
system.214  In a 2001 interview with Foreign Policy, Maj. Gen. William Nash, former 
commanding general of the Army’s 1st Armored Division and regional administrator for 
the United Nations in northern Kosovo, stated that “there are technologies that can make 
up for the land mine” as an individual weapon and as it is used in conjunction with anti-
tank mines.215  The use of landmines alongside anti-tank mines is not necessary for the 
overall effectiveness of U.S. anti-tank mines.   
¶49 The U.S. has not used landmines in almost twenty years, yet the U.S. reserves the 
right to use landmines in defensive operations in countries like Korea, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan.  First, Iraq and Afghanistan are States Parties to the MBT, and under Article 
1, they may not “assist, encourage, or induce” any other states in using landmines on their 
territory or any other states territory.  As such, the U.S. cannot use landmines in either 
country without those countries violating the Treaty.216  Second, the mines placed along 
the DMZ are South Korean, not American, mines and do not affect the ability of the U.S. 
to join the Treaty.217  Therefore, the U.S. argument in support of retaining landmines rests 
on the possibility of the U.S. using mines in Korea as a defensive measure against an 
invasion by North Korea is invalid.   
¶50 Landmines are not an effective measure against a possible invasion of South Korea.  
The former commander of U.S. forces in Korea, Lt. Gen. James Hollingsworth rated the 
utility of landmines in Korea as “minimal.”218  Hollingsworth never relied on landmines 
to “make much of a difference” because “[t]o be blunt, if we are relying on these 
weapons to defend the Korean peninsula, we are in big trouble.”219  The purported 
purpose of landmines in Korea is to stall a North Korean invasion and provide time for 
South Korean and U.S. forces to mobilize.220  However, there are numerous other tactics 
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including tank traps, trenches, and barricades that can delay a North Korean invasion.221  
Also, it is not likely that U.S. and South Korean forces will to be caught off-guard by a 
North Korean ground invasion.  U.S. satellite and spy technologies monitor North Korean 
military activity and would provide advance warning of any mobilization for a ground 
invasion, so U.S. forces would have ample opportunity to prepare.222  Further, U.S. 
military strategy is to first employ precision air and missile attacks, which could halt a 
Korean attack.223  As Lieutenant General Hollingsworth said, the U.S. should not and 
does not have to rely on landmines to protect the Korean Peninsula.    
¶51 There is some indication that the Obama administration may not defer to the 
military’s desire in developing a landmine policy.  During 2010 the U.S. Department of 
State hosted a number of interagency meetings that included representatives from U.S. 
and international NGOs, the ICRC, the UN, and members of the Clinton and Bush 
administration landmine policy teams.224  Additionally, the U.S. has sought input from 
political and military allies on whether the U.S. should join the Treaty.225 This outreach to 
groups other than the U.S. military is possibly a signal that the Obama administration is 
not willing to simply defer to the judgment and will of the military in developing a policy 
on the Mine Ban Treaty. 
VI. CONCLUSION: OBAMA SHOULD JOIN THE MINE BAN TREATY 
¶52 After leaving office, President Clinton admitted that one of his biggest regrets in 
office was his administration’s failure to sign the MBT.226  Why?  Seemingly, Clinton 
realized that landmines’ limited military utility does not outweigh their humanitarian 
effect.  This understanding reflects U.S. policy before and since the formulation of the 
MBT.  The U.S. does not use, produce, or trade landmines.  It reserves the right to, but 
does not use landmines with self-destruct or deactivation mechanisms.  Landmines are 
not necessary for the protection of South Korea, nor can they be used in Iraq or 
Afghanistan without those countries violating the MBT.  Finally, the U.S. has provided 
more humanitarian funding for mine action programs than any other nation. President 
Obama also has enough political support to join the Treaty.  In May 2010, sixty-eight 
U.S. Senators sent President Obama a letter in support of the U.S. joining the MBT.227  
The U.S. refusal to join the Treaty rests solely on the U.S. military’s desire to keep its 
stockpile of landmines, which it does not even use. The Obama administration should 
back the Mine Ban Treaty because it is in the best interest of the United States.  
¶53 The United State’s failure to join the Mine Ban Treaty illustrates American 
exceptionalism at its worst.  Whereas the majority of states understood that the 
humanitarian situation caused by landmines warranted the strongest possible treaty, the 
United States refused to join unless other states accommodated its continued use and 
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stockpile of landmines.  When its demands were rejected, chose to United States bow of 
the process rather than concede to middle-power states.228  Since then, the U.S. has 
consistently developed policies in an attempt stay in line with the international norm 
developed by the MBT.229  As long as the U.S. stays outside of the MBT, its landmine 
policies will be regarded as inadequate. 
¶54 In the years since the U.S. refusal to join the Treaty, it has acted in an increasingly 
unilateral manner.  The Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty and its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the 
Mine Ban Treaty were regarded by the international community as acts of an isolationist 
nation.230  Along with the U.S.’s actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. established a 
clear doctrine of global domination and exceptionalism.231  President Obama has 
articulated a plan of global reintegration and has worked to restore the U.S.’s reputation 
as a cooperationist nation.232  Joining the MBT would signal to the world that the Obama 
administration is serious about working with the international community.  Since the U.S. 
has long opposed the MBT, the international community may regard U.S. ratification of 
the Treaty as an apology for its recent exceptionalist policies.  Finally, the U.S. landmine 
policy is so close to the requirements of the MBT that joining the Treaty would not 
require a drastic shift in practice.  The Obama administration should correct a lasting 
mistake of the Clinton administration by joining the MBT, and in doing so, indicate to the 
world community its desire to reengage and repair relationships. 
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